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'Dicta Observes
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION MEETING
The annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association
will be held at the Antlers Hotel, Colorado Springs, on September 14th and 15th. The first session will convene Friday,
September 14th, at 10:30 A. M. Reports will be submitted
of the work of the Association for the past two years.
An outstanding feature of the meeting will be an exhaustive discussion of the question of incorporating the State
Bar. The proposition is to receive lengthy and careful attention and members will be invited to express their opinions for
and against.
Entertainment has been arranged for after and between
sessions.
A banquet will be held Saturday evening and excellent
speakers have been secured. A tribute will be paid to the
founders of the Colorado Bar Association.

DID YOU KNOWBy GERALD E. WELCH, Associate Editor
HAT the beneficiary of a life insurance policy has such
a vested interest, that the insured's reserved right to
change the beneficiary does not entitle him to surrender
and cancel the policy without the beneficiary's consent?
A first impression might be that-since the insured has
reserved the right to change the beneficiary-the interest of
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the named beneficiary is such a defeasible and contingent one
that the policy may be dealt with freely and independently
of any consent by the beneficiary. However, the State of
Colorado in Hill v. Capitol Life Insurance Company,
(1932) 91 Colo. 300, 14 P. (2d) 1006, adopted the majority rule that, under a policy providing for the changing of
the beneficiary at pleasure, the insured by agreement with the
insurer could not surrender and cancel the policy without the
beneficiary's consent, unless permitted to do so by the terms
of the contract. The case involved an action by the widow
of the insured who brought suit to collect upon a life insurance policy, the first year's premium of which was paid with
a note on which nothing was paid and which within the year
was surrendered in exchange for the surrender and cancellation of the policy. The widow in suing upon the policy
contended that without her consent the cancellation was not
effective, and her contention was upheld, the court limiting
the right of the insured to deal with the policy strictly to the
provisions of the contract of insurance.
This case is relied upon by insurers to require a person
who is insured to obtain the consent of the named beneficiary
to a conversion of a policy when the policy does not specifically provide for such conversion.

That a payment to the Clerk of the Court is not a payment into court so as to protect the payer in the absence of a
court order directing the payment into court?
In order to protect their clients against the possibility of
duplicating payments, as in a case where the plaintiff who
recovers judgment is a statutory agent to bring the suit, attorneys sometimes pay the amount of the judgment to the Clerk
of the Court and regard it as a payment into court. The
State of Colorado in two early cases, Brown et al. v. People
for use, etc., (1876) 3 Colo. Rep. 115; and People for use,
etc. v. Cobb, (1897) 10 Colo. App. 478, 51 P. 523" held a
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payment to the Clerk of the Court is not a payment into
court so as to protect the payer in the absence of legal authority or some order of the court authorizing the Clerk to receive
it.

The two quotations following illustrate the point involved:
"The authorities are Uniform, so far as I am able to find, that
payment to the clerk of money on a judgment or execution, obtained
in the court of which he is clerk, is not payment. He is not authorized
to receive it. It is not a payment into court, unless made by order of
court, or the command in the writ so directs." Brown et al. v. People
for use, etc., 3 Colo. Rep. 115, at 124.
"An order by virtue of which money is paid into court must come
from the court itself, and an entry by the clerk of money as being in
court, no matter in what form, or in what books, without such order
is nugatory." People for use, etc. v. Cobb, 10 Colo. App. 478, at
483, 51 P. 523, 525.
(Contributions are solicited which deal with points or doctrines
of law, with particular emphasis on Colorado law, not commonly
known, or are unusual, and of informative value to the Bar. Address
"Dicta"-"DID YOU KNOW--"

DISBARMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY BAR
ASSOCIATION DUES
Nearly 200 Mississippi attorneys were barred from
practicing in the state supreme court by a ruling handed down
by the high tribunal, sitting en banc, citing failure to comply
with a section of the laws of 1932, requiring payment of $5
annually as dues to the Mississippi State Bar.
Section 25, chapter 121, of the state code, enacted by
the legislature two years ago when the lawmakers reorganized the old state bar association, makes it compulsory that
every attorney in the state hold membership in the newly
organized state bar and provides each shall pay $5 a year
dues.-Case and Comment.

